MAINE MALEFACTORS
March 9, 1898.) Mem. Ed. XXIII, 101; Bishop I, 86.
of which it is a part; and Captain Mahan has written the
best of all naval biographies, about the greatest of all
sea-captains, the man who was himself the embodiment
of sea power in action. (Bookman, June 1897.) Mem.
Ed. XIV, 327-328; Nat. Ed. XII, 281.
MAINE—SINKING OF THE. Being a Jingo, as I am
writing confidentially, I will say, to relieve my feelings,
that I would give anything if President McKinley would
order the fleet to Havana to-morrow. This Cuban
business ought to stop. The Maine was sunk by an act
of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards, I believe;
though we shall never find out definitely, and officially
it will go down as an accident. (Letter of February 16,
1898.) Mem. Ed. XXIII, 99; Bishop I, 85.
____________. Let me again earnestly urge that you
advise the President against our conducting any
examination in conjunction with the Spaniards as to the
Maine's disaster. I myself doubt whether it will be
possible to tell definitely how the disaster occurred by
an investigation, and it may be that we could do it as
well in conjunction with the Spaniards as alone. But I
am sure we could never convince the people at large of
this fact. . . . I was informed that both Speaker Reed and
Senator Hale had stated that we should cease building
any more battleships, in view of the disaster to the
Maine. I cannot believe that the statement is true, for of
course such an attitude, if supported by the people,
would mean that we had reached the last pitch of
national cowardice and baseness. I earnestly wish that
you could see your way clear now, without waiting a
day, to send in a special message, stating that in view of
the disaster to the Maine (and perhaps in view of the
possible needs of this country) instead of
recommending one battleship you ask for two, or better
still, that four battleships be authorized immediately by
Congress. (To Secretary John D. Long, February 19,
1898.) Mem. Ed. XXIII, 99; Bishop I, 85.
____________. Of course I have nothing to say as to
the policy of the Government, but I hope this incident
[Maine] will not be treated by itself, but as part of the
whole Cuban business. There is absolutely but one
possible solution of a permanent nature to that affair,
and that is Cuban independence. The sooner we make
up our minds to this the better. If we can attain our
object peacefully, of course we should try to do so; but
we should attain it one way or the other anyhow. (To
Henry White,
MAINE. See also CUBA; SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.
MAJORITY—TYRANNY OF THE. The majority in
a democracy has no more right to tyrannize over a
minority than, under a different system, the latter would
have to oppress the former; and . . . if there is a moral
principle at stake, the saying that the voice of the
people is the voice of God may be quite as untrue, and
do quite as much mischief, as the old theory of the
divine right of kings. (1887.) Mem. Ed. VIII, 91; Nat.
Ed. VII, 80.
MAJORITY. See also MINORITY; POPULAR RULE;
PRIVILEGE.
"MALEFACTORS OF GREAT WEALTH." Too
much cannot be said against the men of wealth who
sacrifice everything to getting wealth. There is not in
the world a more ignoble character than the mere
money-getting American, insensible to every duty,
regardless of every principle, bent only on amassing a
fortune, and putting his fortune only to the basest
uses —whether these uses be to speculate in stocks and
wreck railroads himself, or to allow his son to lead a
life of foolish and expensive idleness and gross
debauchery, or to purchase some scoundrel of high
social position, foreign or native, for his daughter. Such
a man is only the more dangerous if he occasionally
does some deed like founding a college or endowing a
church, which makes those good people who are also
foolish forget his real iniquity. These men are equally
careless of the working men, whom they oppress, and
of the State, whose existence they imperil. There are
not very many of them, but there is a very great number
of men who approach more or less closely to the type,
and, just in so far as they do so approach, they are
curses to the country. (Forum, February 1895.) Mem.
Ed. XV, 10; Nat. Ed. XIII, 9.
"MALEFACTORS OF GREAT WEALTH" AND
THE PANIC OF 1907. It may well be that the
determination of the government (in which, gentlemen,
it will not waver) to punish certain malefactors of great
wealth, has been responsible for something of the
trouble; at least to the extent of having caused these
men to combine to bring about as much financial stress
as possible, in order to discredit the policy of the
government and thereby secure a reversal of that policy,
so that they may enjoy
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